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Farrell, Brian P.

Brian P. Farrell received his PhD in History from McGill University. Since 1993, he has been Lecturer in Military and European History at the National University of Singapore. Author of several articles on Allied command and strategy in WWII, he is now working on a study of the Malayan campaign and the fall of Singapore.

Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy 1940-1943 Was There a Plan? Vol. 1
1988 0-7734-8357-8
This massive, two-volume study treats the central direction of global war as a problem in its own right, posing these questions: why did the British fight the war as they did from spring 1940? What impact did their direction have both on the war and the British global position? This study differs from the Official History series Grand Strategy by arguing that from summer 1940 British grand strategy was significantly revised, and conducted from that point along broad but distinct outlines laid down by consensus in a guiding concept. It makes new points regarding the relationship between Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff, the nature of the 'integrated' British-American war effort and economic mobilization, the role of Bomber Command in grand strategy, and British perceptions of a 'Second Front' in Europe.

Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy 1940-1943 Was There a Plan? Vol. 2
1988 0-7734-8359-4
This massive, two-volume study treats the central direction of global war as a problem in its own right, posing these questions: why did the British fight the war as they did from spring 1940? What impact did their direction have both on the war and the British global position? This study differs from the Official History series Grand Strategy by arguing that from summer 1940 British grand strategy was significantly revised, and conducted from that point along broad but distinct outlines laid down by consensus in a guiding concept. It makes new points regarding the relationship between Churchill and his Chiefs of Staff, the nature of the 'integrated' British-American war effort and economic mobilization, the role of Bomber Command in grand strategy, and British perceptions of a 'Second Front' in Europe.